Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership
Collaborating to provide solutions to nuclear arms control and disarmament challenges.
Effective verification for achieving nuclear disarmament.
The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership (the Quad) was formed out of our four countries’ shared belief in the necessity of effective verification for achieving nuclear disarmament. Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States all recognise that a credible verification regime in which all States have confidence will be essential for reaching and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons.
About Quad
Projects
Letterpress
The first multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise.
Ongoing projects
Details of Quad’s ongoing projects focussing on verification strategies and technologies.
Our partners
United Kingdom
UK participation in the Quad is led by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and supported by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). The Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC) brings together both government departments to leverage their combined expertise on nuclear arms control and disarmament.
MOD directs and supervises the scientific and technological support to the partnership, delivered primarily through the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).
AWE is responsible for the production, management and dismantlement of UK nuclear warheads and supports wider UK national security activities such as verification research under its Nuclear Threat Reduction programme. The Nuclear Threat Reduction programme also provides technical expertise on nuclear test ban monitoring, radiation detection and nuclear forensics.
United States
The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Verification provides leadership for the U.S. role and technical contributions to the Quad partnership. NNSA participates in, coordinates, and oversees the U.S. multilateral technical cooperation program to inform future nuclear verification research with support from technical experts at the U.S. national laboratories, plants, and sites.
Norway
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) provides overall direction for Norway’s participation in the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership, as well as coordination and funding for the four Norwegian partner institutions.
Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA) is the national authority and expert body in matters concerning nuclear safety, security, safeguards, use of radiation, natural radiation and radioactive contamination in the environment.
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) reports to the Ministry of Defence and is the prime institution responsible for conducting defence-related research and development in a broad range of fields in Norway.
Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) is an independent research foundation that operated Norway’s research reactors until they shut down. IFE is currently preparing for decommissioning of the nuclear installations whilst research in other fields like new materials, cancer treatment, renewable energy and low emission offshore technologies, is continued.
NORSAR is an independent research foundation specializing in seismology and seismic monitoring. NORSAR is the Norwegian Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) National Data Centre, and assists the Norwegian MFA in all matters related to the CTBT.
Sweden
SSM – the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority contributes to the partnership through its experience in verification and the use and development of verification technologies in the field of nuclear safeguards. SSM is the responsible national authority in Sweden for nuclear safety, security, safeguards and nuclear export controls, as well as radiation protection.
The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) is a government authority under the Ministry of Defence and conducts research in defence, security and safety across the full spectrum of issues.
FOI provides technical contributions to the Quad by financing through appropriation from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Resources
Documents
- Selection and deployment of verification technologies
Lessons learned from the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and the LETTERPRESS Simulation - Facilitating a nuclear disarmament verification exercise
Lessons Learned from the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership and the LETTERPRESS Simulation - 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Statement delivered on behalf of the QUAD - 2018 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Statement delivered on behalf of the QUAD - Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership – the story so far
Report by Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States for the third NPT Preparatory Committee, New York, 2 May 2019 - Annex to report on the Quad Verification Partnership at the third NPT preparatory committee
New York, 2 May 2019 - LETTERPRESS Post Simulation Report
Overview of the planning and execution of LETTERPRESS - Verification Strategies Workstream- Quad Methodology for Systematizing Verification Objectives
A methodology that begins to systematically structure the information gathering requirements for a verification system - Verification Technologies Workstream- Methodologies for Tracing Dependencies in Verification Data
An examination of various approaches to identify and track procedural and physical dependencies of verification equipment used in a prior Quad arms control exercise - Data Authentication Demonstration- June 2022
An overview of the Data Authentication Demonstration that was held at the Y-12 National Security Complex (United States) in June 2022 - Verification Technologies Workstream- Authentication and Certification Evaluation
This report describes a tool to evaluate potential authentication and certification (A/C) concerns for different types of equipment, data generation, and data handling at various locations within a nuclear weapons enterprise.
